Asia Foundation Dinner: Remarks by Chargé d’Affaires Daniel Shields (September 27, 2009)
Speeches
Chargé d'Affaires Daniel Shields
Remarks at Asia Foundation Dinner
September 27, 2009
(as prepared for delivery)
Thank you for your gracious introduction. Good evening, distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak with you tonight about U.S.-Southeast Asia relations.
When I spoke at the Asia Foundation's gathering a year and a half ago, I defended the proposition that the United States remained committed to Southeast Asia. Today an energetic new Administration has already revitalized American relations with this part of the world. The Administration's diplomacy, from President Obama and Secretary Clinton on down, freely acknowledges and welcomes Asia's growing weight in world affairs. While maintaining traditional regional alliances and continuing to deepen American engagement with the emerging powers of China and India, the United States also has placed a new emphasis on its relations with the ASEAN countries. As Secretary Clinton said at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July, "The United States is back in Southeast Asia."
Tonight I want to talk with you about what this all means. When we say the United States is back in Southeast Asia, what are we really saying? And how does the U.S. approach to Southeast Asia harmonize with our engagement with Asia as a whole? I will begin by briefly reviewing how the Obama Administration sees Asia and the United States' place in it. I will then discuss how the Administration's actions so far reflect those views and priorities. For those of you familiar with the February 2009 version of the Asia Foundation's quadrennial recommendations on "America's Role in Asia," I hope you will take note how many of those points the United States has already begun to address since President Obama's inauguration.
I will close by touching on some of the most prominent challenges that the United States and its Southeast Asian allies and partners will have to face together in the near term. Some of the challenges are indeed severe, but we can face them with confidence. The United States' renewed engagement in the region stems from the strong and abiding interests we share with the nations of Southeast Asia and greater Asia. These shared interests provide a stable core from which we can address our common challenges and work toward the common good desired by all: a peaceful and prosperous Asia Pacific whose diverse peoples will be empowered to chart their own paths to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
The United States and Asia
First, then: How does Asia figure in the Obama Administration's views and what role does the Administration see for the United States in Asia?
The most striking element in the Administration's approach is a robust, even enthusiastic, embrace of the undeniable fact of American and Asian interdependence. Before Secretary Clinton's first visit to Asia as Secretary of State, she said she wanted her trip to signal that the United States needs "strong partners across the Pacific" because the region is "indispensable" to American security and prosperity. In Jakarta, she stressed the United States' desire to listen to our friends in ASEAN and to act on what we heard; and this emphasis on listening is a corollary of recognizing our interdependence with our Asian partners.
At his confirmation hearing in June, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell told Congress that "the United States itself is a Pacific nation, and in every regard -- geopolitically, militarily, diplomatically, and economically -- Asia and the Pacific are indispensable" -- that word again -- "to addressing the challenges and seizing the opportunities of the 21st century." Our Deputy Secretary of State, James Steinberg, has drawn an important lesson from the financial crisis and economic downturn: the hypothesis that Asia Pacific economies have decoupled from the American economy was wrong, and our economic futures are more closely linked than ever. And Defense Secretary Robert Gates made a related point about security at this year's Shangri-La Dialogue, noting that the United States is a resident power in Asia and that our defense strategy is shifting toward enabling military partners to better defend themselves and contribute to overall security in a world where "nearly all the challenges we face are too complex to go it alone."
Acknowledging this growing interdependence leads naturally to increasing the United States' engagement in Asia. The question, then, is how to do so in a stable and productive way. The Obama Administration's first several months have sketched the outline of a dual response to this question. On the one hand, the United States will maintain the existing alliances that have served the world so well; on the other hand, we will accelerate our engagement, and pursue new forms of engagement, with the growing powers of China and India, as well as ASEAN.
The United States' alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia remain the bedrock of Asian security and prosperity. This is not just an American view, but a truth almost universally acknowledged. Thus the new government of Japan -- whose views may vary considerably from those of its predecessors -- made it clear even before taking office that Japan's alliance with the United States would remain the core of Japanese diplomacy. We expect our strong framework of bilateral alliances, supported by our stable friendships with partners like Singapore and Brunei, to continue providing public goods in Southeast Asia on an enormous scale by keeping the peace in East Asia as a whole, as it has for decades.
If the fact of interdependence suggests a continuity-oriented approach to long-established U.S. relationships in Asia, it recommends at the same time an energetic effort to forge closer links with the emerging powers. No one would deny that the rise of China and India demands engagement by the United States. They are, of course, the two most populous nations in the world, and India is the world's most populous democracy. More importantly, they are in the process of achieving a political and economic stature commensurate with their populations. Under a purchasing power parity measurement of GDP, China is now the world's second largest economy, and India the fourth largest. Though the ASEAN countries excite less feverish media commentary than the two emerging giants, as a group, ASEAN is equally critical to the United States. The ten ASEAN countries are the United States' second largest export market in Asia, just behind China, and the destination for $130 billion of private U.S. investment. Just a few months ago, Deputy Secretary Steinberg identified ASEAN itself as being "at the core of the emerging regional structures of cooperation throughout Asia to which we are deeply committed." ASEAN's largest member, Indonesia, is also an emerging power in its own right, as the world's fourth most populous country and third most populous democracy.
The Obama Administration recognizes that it is imperative for the United States to pursue constructive ties with all of these rising powers simultaneously, to promote structures of international cooperation that can accommodate the momentous changes that are under way in Asia's development, and to help mitigate any rivalries or conflicts that may arise as new powers find their places in the region.
The Obama Administration's Engagement with Asia and Southeast Asia
So much for theory; what about practice? For the past few minutes, I have tried to summarize the United States' interests in Asia and paint the Asian strategic landscape from an American point of view. Now I will show how the Obama Administration has acted on these prescriptions, by taking you through the various initiatives and agreements we've embarked on since President Obama took office. This will necessarily be a whirlwind tour covering only the highlights, with special attention to Southeast Asia in light of this evening's theme. Although the Administration is young, it has done a lot in eight months.
Less than a month after Barack Obama was inaugurated as President of the United States, Secretary Clinton delivered a major speech in New York entitled "U.S.-Asia Relations: Indispensable to Our Future." That was the prelude to her first trip abroad as Secretary, when she visited Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and China.
In Japan, Secretary Clinton signed the Guam International Agreement to relocate 8,000 U.S. Marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam. In Jakarta a few days later, she visited the ASEAN Secretariat and announced that the United States was launching the interagency process needed to pursue accession to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Secretary Clinton did not neglect the bilateral relationship with Indonesia: the two countries announced they would form a Comprehensive Partnership to provide a framework for advancing their common interests on regional and global issues. Secretary Clinton also announced in February that the United States would conduct a review of its policy toward Burma, and the results of that review will be announced shortly.
In late February, then-Prime Minister Aso of Japan became the first foreign leader to call on President Obama in Washington. In March, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang visited Secretary Clinton at the State Department. At the beginning of April, in conjunction with the G-20 Summit in London, President Obama held bilateral meetings with President Hu of China, Prime Minister Singh of India, and President Lee of South Korea, among other world leaders. In mid-April, the United States, Japan, and Australia convened their Trilateral Strategic Dialogue in Honolulu. In late April, Singapore's Foreign Minister Yeo met with Secretary Clinton in Washington.
At the beginning of May, the United States and the Philippines co-hosted an ASEAN Regional Forum Voluntary Demonstration of Response -- essentially a disaster relief exercise -- in the Philippines, with substantial ASEAN and Japanese participation as well as a Chinese observer. In mid-May, Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah called on Secretary Clinton and they jointly announced Malaysia's participation in the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia -- a key maritime security effort in which Singapore and Indonesia also participate. At the end of May, Defense Secretary Gates and Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg participated in the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, meeting with their counterparts from across the region. Then in June, Under Secretary of Defense Michèle Flournoy traveled to Beijing for the Defense Consultative Talks, our highest-level military-to-military dialogue with China.
In early July, the United States, China and Singapore co-chaired the inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum Intersessional Meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament in Beijing. This was the first annual meeting of ARF participants to focus on finding communal approaches to the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the region, and to working together toward achieving President Obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons.
In mid-July, United States Trade Representative Kirk attended the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade Meeting in Singapore. Later that month, Secretary Clinton made her second trip to Asia as Secretary of State. She went first to India, where she launched a new high-level strategic dialogue with her counterpart, External Affairs Minister Krishna. She then attended the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Thailand, where she signed the instrument of accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation on behalf of the United States. She remained in Thailand to attend the ASEAN Regional Forum, announcing plans to increase USAID climate change funding for Southeast Asia, to launch a new regional initiative to support climate change research and investments, and to request a high-level U.S.-ASEAN climate change dialogue. The Secretary also hosted the first-ever ministerial meeting between the United States and the Lower Mekong countries of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand, to discuss shared interests relating to water, health, and the environment.
In late July, Secretary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Geithner co-chaired the inaugural round of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, with Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo and Vice Premier Wang Qishan leading the Chinese delegation. That session culminated in the signing of an important U.S.-China Memorandum of Understanding to Enhance Cooperation in Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment.
Deputy Secretary Steinberg, Special Representative for North Korea Policy Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks Ambassador Sung Kim, and Ambassador Philip Goldberg, the U.S. Coordinator for the Implementation of UNSCR 1874, have all traveled multiple times to Asia recently to consult with counterparts on North Korea issues. Assistant Secretary Campbell visited Japan, had positive discussions with his Japanese counterparts, and reaffirmed the fundamentals of our alliance. North Korea's nuclear programs were a key part of discussions with Asian leaders on the margins of the UN General Assembly.
The Trilateral Strategic Dialogue partners -- the United States, Japan, and Australia -- held their fourth ministerial meeting on September 21. On the same day, Deputy Secretary Steinberg met with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Tea Banh. Secretary Clinton is scheduled to hold a bilateral meeting with her Cambodian counterpart, Hor Namhong, in New York on September 28. The Deputy Secretary is back in the region once again at this very moment. He arrived in Hanoi yesterday and is scheduled to visit Kuala Lumpur, Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo over the next few days. And finally, as you all know, President Obama has announced that he will attend the APEC Leaders Meeting here in Singapore in November. It also has been announced that he will visit China.
Taken singly, none of these events will be a revelation to you; most of you were well aware of each one as it occurred. Only by considering them together, and reflecting that all but the last took place within the first eight months or so of the new Administration, can you can appreciate the extraordinary burst of creative energy that justifies Secretary Clinton's claim that "the United States is back" -- certainly in Southeast Asia, but also in the Asia Pacific as a whole. I have limited my list to the highest-level interactions, leaving countless lower-level but essential avenues of engagement uncatalogued. In short, the Administration has been true to the vision of Asia and of the United States in Asia that I described earlier: maintaining our existing ties while developing essential new ones, and re-engaging with Southeast Asia as part of a comprehensive approach to the entire region. If we and our Asian partners continue as we have begun, we can expect the United States' relationships in the region to deepen and mature, allowing all concerned parties to reap new benefits, and enabling all of us to meet regional and global challenges more effectively in concert.
Challenges Facing the United States and Southeast Asia
Now I would like to talk to you about some of those challenges. Though there are many facing us today, I will discuss five of the most urgent problems that bear on Asian security: addressing the ongoing weakness of the world economy, denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, engaging Iran on its own nuclear program, stabilizing Afghanistan, and dealing with the regime in Burma.
Compared to our worst fears of a few months ago, recent economic statistics have been encouraging, and nowhere more so than in Asia. Yet the recovery is in an early stage, and we don't yet know how global demand will respond to the phasing out of the stimulus measures that many governments introduced. It remains true, as Deputy Secretary Steinberg said in May, that we will need unprecedented cooperation between the U.S. and the rest of the Asia Pacific to build a new foundation for sustainable long-term economic growth. APEC is a key institution for deepening regional economic integration and continuing to resist protectionism. As this year's APEC host, Singapore has been instrumental in tailoring the proceedings to the ongoing crisis under the theme of "Sustaining Growth, Connecting the Region." But APEC's critical role continues in the gaps between the meetings of leaders and senior officials. Whether in facilitating trade, enhancing microfinance opportunities, building technological capacity in small- and medium-sized businesses, or strengthening social safety nets, APEC's day-to-day work is building the structures of economic cooperation and integration that we need to put the current crisis behind us and avoid another one.
North Korea poses an especially acute challenge. Here our actions have reflected a consultative approach to regional diplomacy. First, the Administration remains committed to the Six-Party Talks and achieving the goal of the 2005 Joint Statement: the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Second, Secretary Clinton appointed an experienced Korea hand, Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, to serve as Special Representative for North Korea Policy, overseeing our efforts in the Six-Party Talks. Along with Ambassador Sung Kim, Special Envoy for the Six-Party Talks, Ambassador Bosworth has consulted closely with the other participating countries to develop a strategy to respond to North Korea. There is broad consensus among the parties on three core items: denuclearization remains the core objective and essential goal of our engagement with North Korea, the Six-Party process is the best mechanism for achieving denuclearization, and we remain committed to the full implementation of UNSCRs 1718 and 1874. Southeast Asian nations have advanced that goal by responding admirably to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, designed to halt any proliferation-related trade with North Korea. Even Burma announced publicly that it would enforce that resolution.
Iran's nuclear program presents a different challenge. The United States agrees -- as President Obama reaffirmed at the G-20 Pittsburgh Summit on Friday -- that Iran has the right to civil nuclear power. That is not at issue. At issue is Iran's continued refusal to fully address the international community's concerns about Iran's nuclear program -- as illustrated most recently by last week's revelation that the Iranian government has been building an undisclosed uranium enrichment facility for several years. As the UN Security Council has made clear in repeated resolutions, Iran is not in compliance with its international obligations. Even before the IAEA became aware of Iran's secret facility, its latest report indicated that Iran was continuing to expand its nuclear program and deny the IAEA full cooperation. Iran's continued refusal to cooperate has damaged the credibility of its claim that it does not seek a nuclear weapon, and as the President said, its "decision to build yet another nuclear facility," the size and configuration of which are "inconsistent with a peaceful program," "without notifying the IAEA represents a direct challenge to the basic compact at the center of the non-proliferation regime."
The United States remains committed to serious, meaningful engagement with Iran -- not as an end in itself, but as a means of addressing the growing concerns that we and our international partners have about Iran's actions, especially on the nuclear issue. The October 1 meeting with our counterparts from the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany in the P-5+1 will provide Iran with the opportunity to demonstrate that it is ready to address international concerns head on. The international community has made abundantly clear what is possible for all Iranians if Iran lives up to its responsibilities on the nuclear issue -- the benefits of economic connections to the rest of the world, cooperation on peaceful nuclear energy, and partnership in education and science. But there will be accompanying costs for Iran's continued defiance: more isolation and economic pressure, less possibility of progress for the people of Iran. So Iran faces a clear choice, and its leaders must now decide whether to join the international community in this important effort. As President Obama said on Friday, Iran must "take concrete steps to create confidence and transparency in its nuclear program and to demonstrate that it is committed to establishing its peaceful intentions through meaningful dialogue and concrete actions."
Meanwhile, Southeast Asian countries may find themselves used as transshipment points for relevant equipment to Iran. To take one example, in January the U.S. Department of State officially linked two businessmen who formerly operated in Malaysia to the now-defunct nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. The cooperation of the Malaysian government, along with the efforts of other countries, helped shut down the Khan network, which is known to have provided centrifuge equipment clandestinely to Iran. Malaysia, and other countries in the region, can do more to prevent their territory from being abused by proliferators, which is why we have called on countries in the region to pass new export control laws, strengthen existing laws, and step up implementation of these laws to prevent the transfer of proliferation-sensitive equipment through its territory to and use of its financial system by Iran and other states of concern. Southeast Asian countries, by using diplomatic channels to urge Iran to meet its obligations and by participating fully in cooperative measures to combat nuclear proliferation, have an important role to play, together with the United States and other responsible international partners, in averting the potential spread of nuclear weapons in western Asia and throughout the region.
The urgent need for stabilization and development in Afghanistan needs no emphasis from me. The struggle of the Afghan people for an end to civil strife and for the attainment of true sovereignty, in the form of legitimate political institutions that can serve their needs, is self-evident. Conversely, the dangers posed by an Afghan collapse or a slide into fundamentalist tyranny, with potential spillover effects in neighboring Pakistan or a much wider region, are plain for all to see. The recent election holds out hope of political progress and the United States supports the work of the Independent Election Commission and the Electoral Complaints Commission as they conduct the challenging task of counting ballots and investigating and adjudicating potential fraud according to their responsibilities under Afghan law. While there have been allegations of fraud, it is important to note that participants are seeking redress through legal process and not through violence, as has happened in the past. Only Afghans can decisively shape their own political destiny, but others can work to improve their security, grow their economy, and help them build capacity in their civil society. Many Southeast Asian countries can be full partners in those endeavors, and some are already meeting the challenge. Consider Singapore, which despite its small size has already deployed a military construction engineering team, multiple medical teams, and a weapons-locating radar team in support of the International Security Assistance Force, with plans to send a KC-135 air refueling craft later this year. In civil society initiatives this year, Singapore co-sponsored a course for Afghan Transport Ministry officials aimed at improving civil aviation safety, and hosted an anti-corruption study tour for officials from Afghanistan's High Office of Oversight.
Finally, I want to mention, as I did last year, the unique challenge within ASEAN itself -- namely, the Burma issue. I mentioned earlier that Secretary Clinton initiated a review of U.S. policy toward Burma back in February. The results of that review will be announced soon, but as the Secretary re-emphasized at the United Nations General Assembly last week, any debate that pits sanctions against engagement creates a false choice. Rather, going forward, the United States will need to employ both of these tools.
The aim of the United States is not to impose its will on the Burmese people, but to ensure that they can live in a unified, peaceful, and prosperous country, led by a democratic government that respects the rights of its citizens. While we are in the final stages of our discussions within the Administration and with our Congress, Secretary Clinton has made it clear that the goals of the U.S. Burma policy will remain the same. The United States will maintain its long-standing commitment to credible democratic reform, the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners, including Aung San Suu Kyi, and serious dialogue among the authorities, the democratic opposition, and the Burma's ethnic nationalities. We also have major concerns about Burmese military cooperation with North Korea. Burma should cease any such cooperation and comply fully with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874.
We continue to believe that ASEAN, with its special contacts and relationships of trust with the Burmese regime, has a unique role to play in urging the generals along the road to redemption. The United States cannot and should not dictate how the other ASEAN countries conduct their relations with Burma, but we hope that each ASEAN member will use any influence it has with the Burmese regime to secure the release of political prisoners and meaningful political reform, as well as to prevent proliferation-related activities. We also encourage ASEAN to communicate to Burma that the generals have not responded appropriately or constructively, either to the concerns expressed by ASEAN members or to international calls for true political reconciliation.
Conclusion
My recitation of some of the key challenges facing the United States and Southeast Asia should reinforce, and not obscure, the main theme of my remarks tonight: the Obama Administration has acted on the conviction that the United States and Asia need each other more and more, impelling us to engage each other more deeply, and on a broader range of issues, than ever before. As the Administration explores the growing U.S. relationships with China, India, and ASEAN in the context of a stable framework of Asian security alliances and bilateral friendships, we can be sure of several things that give grounds for optimism about our ability to solve the kinds of problems I discussed a few moments ago.
First, although some have made the claim that the rise of China is inherently threatening to both the United States and Southeast Asia, we do not agree. We salute China's achievements in creating economic opportunities for its people, and we believe that a strong, prosperous, and responsible China can promote peace and stability in the Asia Pacific. Trade and growth are not a zero-sum game, and although there are bound to be disagreements and friction as China assumes a greater role in regional and world affairs, there is no reason to think that it must lead to conflict, which is in neither the United States' nor China's interest. The Chinese, Southeast Asian, and American economies are already thoroughly intertwined, and the important thing is to maintain open communications so that any emerging differences can be managed peacefully. Through the Strategic and Economic Dialogue and numerous other channels, we will keep the U.S.-China relationship growing in a stable way, and we will do what we can to encourage China to continue to be a friendly neighbor to the nations of Southeast Asia -- an outcome that is, in any event, in China's own interest.
Second, we will continue to support the evolution of a regional architecture that can accommodate the changes taking place in the world's power dynamics. ASEAN has shown it can be an important player in promoting regional peace and stability, as when it came to agreement with China on the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea. The ASEAN Regional Forum is developing into a valuable venue to discuss regional security concerns like terrorism, nonproliferation and piracy. With respect to the continued evolution of ASEAN itself, the United States applauds the recent creation of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights and looks forward to supporting its growth into a distinguished body that will serve the interests of Southeast Asia's people. We listened when Southeast Asia expressed concern that the United States was not engaged enough in the region. However, with the new Charter in place, now is the time for ASEAN to really breathe life into this premier regional grouping. Meanwhile, within the framework of our Enhanced Partnership, the United States will continue to support ASEAN's efforts to achieve full implementation of the ASEAN Charter. Through the ADVANCE program, including the ASEAN-U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility, USAID and the U.S. Department of State have funded many useful projects in support of further ASEAN integration, and they will continue to do so.
Finally, we will maintain the spirit of true partnership and mutual respect in which the Obama Administration has begun its diplomacy. This means continuing to listen in good faith to our friends in ASEAN and acting on what we hear from them. It means being willing to talk to those, like North Korea and Iran, with whom we have fundamental disagreements, as long as doing so may be productive and serve the common good. It means seeking input and, where possible, consensus on transnational challenges such as climate change and terrorism. And it means following the logic of interdependence to its conclusion and acknowledging that what the United States wants for Asia must ultimately be what the peoples of Asia surely want for themselves: peace, prosperity, good and legitimate governance, and the knowledge that these benefits will be secured for their posterity by trustworthy institutions. We look to a world, in other words, where it is perfectly safe and natural for us to depend on one another, as we increasingly do.
Thanks to you all for your attention. I wish you a productive conference, and I'll be happy to take your questions.