U.S. Department of Homeland Security
The American Chamber of Commerce in Singapore
March 29, 2006
Q:
Mr. Chertoff, my wife is Singaporean and I’m American. We go to the
U.S. in the summer. I go through Immigration in a matter of minutes;
she goes through a lot of hassle frequently with the Immigration
officials and all the different forms to fill in for all the
procedures. This is unique to going to the United States, in contrast
with other countries. What can your group do to make the immigration
process more friendly? I’m not suggesting any lowering of security,
but make the process more efficient and more friendly.
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
Well, we are trying to make it more friendly, first of all, by working
some pilot programs at the airports. Some of this is management of
traffic flow. Some of it is reconfiguring airports. Singapore, of
course, is a visa waiver country, and I think it is on track to
continue that status, so that should eliminate the issue of getting a
visa. I have to say, I don’t think of the forms as terribly onerous.
There are forms to be filled out, but is not like filling out your tax
forms. I see people doing the forms on the airplane. So, I think what
we are really talking about are issues of managing airports and lines,
and some of that may really be in the hands of local port authorities.
One step we have taken is, through U.S. VISIT, we now use the biometric
fingerprint as an easy way of checking people when they come into the
country. I think that is not only a positive step for security, but
it’s a very quick process. I’ve seen it. Once you get up to the front
of the line, you put your two forefingers down; it comes up within a
matter of five or ten seconds. So, unless there is something unusual
that gets someone called into secondary screening, it should be
actually a fairly painless process. We are going to continue to try to
refine it and make it better.
Q: There have
been some real positive developments on the world-wide stage in terms
of dealing with port security. One particular thing that my company,
IBM, has been very supportive of is the framework for supply-chain
security. Trying to advocate on the business level to governments
about the advantages of implementing these minimum standards, we’ve run
into sort of a road block. Or at least governments are pushing back
and saying, “Well, what’s in it for us? Is this going to benefit us or
is it just going to slow our own goods going through the ports?” They
talk about the U.S. suggestion at one point that we might create a
green lane, for instance. I’m just wondering where we are in the
process? Is a green lane still being considered?
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
Absolutely, we already do have a kind of a green lane, because we do
assess risk with respect to containers. Containers that come with
security assurances are lower risk and therefore much less likely to be
inspected. Now, we’ll always do a certain amount of random inspection
no matter what. I think that’s just good security policy. But
ultimately, I think the vision we have is a vision in which -- with
proper security protocols on the front end -- the very great likelihood
is the container will move very rapidly when it reaches the United
States. The flip side of that is going to be those ports that don’t
have that kind of security, we’ll be able to spend a lot more time
going through the containers coming out of those ports. So, I think
you can do the math. There will be a real benefit to having the
security programs; those that don’t will find customs inspectors
spending a lot more time opening up the bulk.
Q:
There has been a lot of discussion about seal verification on
containers. I’m wondering when there will be a seal verification
ruling from your department?
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
Yes, we are in process of looking at a lot of different programs that
we are going to use to enhance parts of security freights. Some
element of that might involve a seal verification technology or some
kind of locking technology. We want to make sure that we’ve explored
all the different options. We want to make sure we really understand
the benefits. If you lock the door, and it’s really easy to drill a
hole in the top, I’m not sure that’s going to add a lot of value. So,
I know these things sometimes seem to proceed slowly. Usually, what we
have to do is proceed by rule making. Often what we try to do is to
start first with a voluntary incentive program where we essentially
give you credit if you take a certain step, but we don’t necessarily
mandate it. This is one of the kinds of things we are looking at, as
we speak.
Q: Secretary Chertoff, we’re a
soybean processing and grain handling company, with a large operation
in the Delta region in the United States. First of all, I’m sure I
speak for many when I want to say thank you for all the hard work you
are doing. You clearly have one of, if not the, toughest jobs in
government and certainly one of the most important. Secondly, I’m
wondering what’s been done in the wake of Katrina to improve the
potential for disruption to the grain handling infrastructure. This
caused such a negative ripple affect to the farm belt and to U.S.
exports during that two-week period where exports were shut down.
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
You mean because of the port being blocked? Well, you know, this is a
little bit tough, because first of all, we can’t stop hurricanes. So
when you do have a Category Three hurricane, you have a huge amount of
debris deposited in the navigable waterway. The Coast Guard does get
busy clearing that out. I think they were very quick in clearing that
out. This was a potentially huge catastrophic thing, and I remember
during the week of Katrina, this was brought to my attention. We spent
a fair amount of time talking about how to deal with this issue,
because we knew it could be economically devastating and also be a
problem in terms of people eating. It was really fine work again by
the Coast Guard and by other government authorities to help us clear
that channel very quickly and render it safe to navigation. The short
answer is, I don’t know that there is a lot we could do to reduce the
risk of that happening. The Coast Guard is more expert that I am in
terms of whether there are restrictions we ought to enact in terms of
what kinds of things are near the waterway or additional measures. At
the end of the day, if you get a hurricane of some force that puts a
lot of stuff in the water, that’s going to be a problem.
Q:
Mr. Secretary, in the last couple of weeks, we’ve seen the Dubai ports
deal scuttled. We’ve seen an Israeli company unable to take over an
American software firm. And as of last night – I was watching “Squawk
Box” – where a fellow was talking about the security risks of Alcatel
taking over Lucent. Is free trade dying in the U.S.?
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
No. I think it’s important to treat each of these as separate cases.
I’m limited in what I can say about them. This process of reviewing
foreign investment for national security has been with us for many
years. It has worked well. There are occasionally deals that are
either disapproved or the handwriting is on the wall so people pull the
deal. More often, when we have troubling deals, we impose restrictions
that deal with national security issues, and allow the transaction to
go forward. Dubai Ports World presents somewhat of a different issue
because there, I think, what you saw was a judgment by the people who
had looked at the transaction that with the additional measures that
the company was prepared to accept, which actually and ironically,
would have net increased the amount of security if you compare to what
was the case without the deal. We thought it was a deal that could
forward on security grounds. It apparently tapped into a nerve of
concern. It may be that one lesson is the need to educate the public
and Congress in advance about the nature of, and the importance of,
these transactions. I certainly think that we were dealing with a
country here, and a company, that has been friendly to the United
States. We have huge military assets that operate in that port with
very good security. And it would be a really bad thing if we suggested
to the world that we don’t know who our friends are, or we treat our
friends like enemies. I’d say a critical element of not only trade
policy and homeland security policy, but national security policy, is
you ought to make it very clear to the world: we treat our friends as
friends; we treat our enemies as enemies, and we do not confuse the
two. That being said, I think that I would not put too much weight on
that one transaction. Every once in a while a transaction comes along
where something happens, and for whatever reason it becomes a huge
public issue, but it doesn’t always serve as a precedent in the
future. There will be obviously some discussions about changes to the
CFIUS process. I think it is important we do not politicize the
process. It’s important it still be operated based on the facts and
understanding of what the situation is and taking steps forward to make
sure we address any national or homeland security concerns. But I do
think we need to educate people to really understand what are real
threats, and what are not real threats. And sometimes there are things
that people think are real threats that are not; and sometimes people
don’t think about something that actually turns out to be a real
threat. Certainly I think we have been pretty clear in saying that we
want to encourage investment. We do obviously have to make sure that
we can address any security concerns, but we don’t want to be
unthinking about it, nor do we want to convert the CFIUS process into
an economic protectionism process, where it becomes a surrogate method
for keeping out competition or keeping out investment because of
nonsecurity related concerns.
Q: Secretary
Chertoff . . . I work for a global employee mobility company, and of
course part of our job is we send a lot of repatriating families back
to the United States, as well as people from overseas who go to the
U.S. to work. So we send household goods and personal effects to the
U.S. And in the last two years, it seems like household goods and
personal effects seem to be in a blacklisted category and it seems to
have experienced 100 percent customs inspections at U.S. ports. So my
question is, if this is so, is there anything the industry can do to
perhaps work towards, you know, gaining the trust of your department to
ensure that these things can move a whole lot faster, because obviously
there is a lot of emotional attachment toward, you know, the
anxiousness of getting the shipments as soon as possible. Thank you.
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
That’s a very challenging issue. You point out obviously when you are
dealing with consolidating large individual or small individual groups
of items into a large shipment that common sense tells you that this is
a kind of classic area that you have to be careful about. It would be
very easy for someone -- you don’t have a known shipper -- it would be
very easy for somebody to put something into that. And I think what we
are looking for is increased understanding of what goes in, and making
sure that once something does go in, it can’t be tampered with. So to
the extent that businesses invest in a model that creates some kind of
verification about what goes in, and does it up front, I think that is
a positive step. But I would be -- I don’t want to mislead you -- I
think that freight forwarders who consolidate large numbers of
different shipments are always going to be in a different category than
shippers who deal with regular known shipments that have been based on
what is produced in factories, for perfectly obvious reasons. But
again I would put the burden on the industry. If you can convince us
that you have a way of creating a level of trust and kind of a
“registered traveler” for these kinds of goods, we are certainly open
to listen.
MODERATOR: Any questions from the press?
Q:
May I ask . . . recently there was an incident of some radioactive
material that apparently was smuggled in through Canada and Mexico. It
was in the news recently. Can you comment on it?
SECRETARY CHERTOFF:
I don’t know if I can say much about it. First of all, it wasn’t
radioactive material that was smuggled, and it was a test that a
government agency did. I will only tell you what is in news
accounts. I haven’t seen the report. The news accounts relate that
the material was in fact picked up on the radiation portal monitors and
the question was whether there was phony documentation, forged
documentation it had come out of a nuclear regulatory commission. And
I think it raised some legitimate questions about whether we need to
have a tighter flow of documentation or tighter control over the kinds
of documents that will be accepted for certain kinds of shipments.
Really, I think it is an issue that has to do with the regulation of
radioactive material that is available for medical use for perfectly
benign purposes. I want to emphasize by the way that this could not --
by any remote stretch of the imagination – have resulted in a nuclear
bomb. There was some debate in the press about whether there was
enough material to make a radiological bomb, and I can’t tell you the
answer to that. We are always dealing with the challenge of raising
the level of security. And in this case, I think the good news was
that the detectors did work and the customs and border protection
inspectors properly followed the protocols, and if we need to tighten
up on the general rules that govern the transmission of radioactive
material for legitimate purposes, then we ought to do that.
AMCHAM PRESIDENT:
Mr. Secretary, as you can see, there is a great deal of interest and
support here for what you are doing. And we want to thank you very
much, and hope on your next Asia trip you will make another stop here.
