Dialogue on "Security in Asia: Concepts, Threats, and Assurances After 9-11

by
Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Daley
to the Center on International Cooperation

Hilton Singapore
April 22, 2004
Tuesday 7:00 p.m.

(As Prepared for Delivery)

I very much appreciate the chance to share perspectives with a well-informed audience.

It has now been almost 2 1/2 years since the tragic attack on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon. Together, we have been on a sometimes painful learning curve and confronted new threats posed by terrorism. We have also achieved an unprecedented level of regional cooperation. However, significant challenges remain. I look forward to exploring both the challenges and opportunities for cooperation today.

As I approached this speech, I noted with interest the CIC’s reference in its invitation letter to the “new U.S. security doctrine,” which is having a “tectonic impact on security concepts” throughout the world. I am not sure that is actually the case, but being from Washington, it is sometimes difficult for me to appreciate how others see us.

It is true that the United States - as well as many countries in this region - has embarked on global war against terrorism, marshalling new resources and expanding and adapting our existing international relationships. But it is equally true that our core commitments, goals and vision for the Asia-Pacific region remain unchanged. I would argue that none of our core goals, whether the more general such as peace, prosperity and democracy or more specific such as intellectual property rights, trafficking in persons, counter-narcotics or HIV/AIDs to name a few have been short-changed.

If there has been a tectonic shift, it is less in reaction to assumed changes to U.S. security doctrine than in an appreciation that the U.S. is not the only, nor in many cases in the region, the prime target of terrorist organizations. Jemmah Islamayha, for example, may aspire to change some aspects of American policy, but this pales in comparison to its desire for regime change in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei and re-drawing of a number of national boundaries. Five years ago, China had a different appreciation of the role of terrorism in Afghanistan and its implications for Chinese security. Today, China’s appreciation of this problem and that of the U.S. are rather closer as we might infer from Ch ina’s reaction to the presence of U.S. military forces in Central Asia.

As a point of reference, let me outline current U.S. priorities and activities in the security area, which reflect our longstanding interests in East Asia as well as the current challenges, many of which we will likely face for the next decade or more.

Regional Stability

Our commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region remains steadfast. Even as we conduct operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are prepared to honor in the field with military force our traditional security commitments in Asia. We have also been prepared politically and capable militarily to send highly trained units to operate in support of allies who face terrorist challenges, such as that posed to the Philippines by the Abu Sayaf Group. Our capabilities in the Pacific have grown since 9/11, not diminished. It is also important to recognize that in this region, the effort against terrorism is foremost an intelligence and law enforcement effort,. not a military one and these areas by their nature are less visible than movements of major military units.

Maintaining Positive U.S. Engagement

Beyond counter-terrorism, we are giving significant attention to eliminating of the threat of North Korean nuclear programs; seeking full integration of China into established regional and global institutions; sustaining and strengthening effective, inclusive multilateral mechanisms in the region; and promoting economic prosperity, democracy, human rights, health and education. I could continue at some length, but I think you get the point.

Our treaty allies, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand, are strategic partners in and beyond the region, with whom we share common perspectives on a steadily increasing range of issues. In a reflection of Asia’s increasing acceptance of broader responsibilities, each has made important contributions to efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and Iraq. They remain pillars of security and prosperity in the region. Countries that are not de jure allies can be effective partners and we are strengthening those relationships. For example, it is no secret that we now negotiating a Strategic Framework Agreement with Singapore.

Combating Terrorism

Despite the perception of the U.S. policy as being unilateral in approach, we have consistently emphasized cooperation in Southeast Asia and these international efforts and efforts by individual countries in the region have thwarted planned terrorist attacks, detained or arrested over a 250 members if al-Qaida and Jemmah Islamayah. Perhaps most important, together, we have begun to not only constrict the physical space but also the political space in which these criminals operate. A year ago, some countries were reluctant to accept the immediacy of the terrorist threat to them and the region. This hesitancy or even denial has disappeared in some states. Others still ponder the electoral consequences of tough measures, but none have thrown in the towel and as juridical, political and law enforcement measures are emplaced, the political space for violent radicals is constricting. Literally, the noose is tightening.

One important issue needs more study and that is the question of the “root causes of terror.” It is powerfully tempting to draw a connection between terrorism and one or another issue because a casual relationship will help inform both policy and resource allocation. But not everything that is intuitive is necessarily correct. For example, I do not accept as a given that poverty breeds terrorism.

In a number of countries, the terrorists – not just the leaders, but the followers as well – were predominantly from middle class backgrounds, had decent jobs, decent housing and considerable opportunity for advancement. They were not poor or dispossessed. On the other hand, we can see how circumstances that substitute indoctrination for education can bolster a supply of recruits for terrorist movements. So, where this may be a concern, we are trying to help with resources for education under the clear and undisputed direction of the countries involved.

For example, we are working with Indonesia on an initiative to expand educational opportunities for all Indonesians and reduce the appeal of educational institutions that advocate violence. We project spending $157 million on this effort in the next five years. More broadly, Indonesia’s traditions of tolerance and multiculturalism are what we must help Indonesians to preserve. We also have ongoing programs for police training and reform in Indonesia that will strengthen their ability to combat terrorism, and we are working to support the ability of the justice system to prosecute terrorists.

In the Philippines, there are comparable but different elements. We are directing both military resources and economic assistance toward counter-terrorism. We are working to strengthen the ability of the Philippine military and law enforcement officials to combat terrorism directly, and we have pledged material and political support for a peace process for Mindanao between the Philippine Government and the Southern Island of Mindanao-centered Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which the Government of Malaysia is facilitating.

I want to emphasize that we see Kuala Lumpur in the lead for the international community. Ours is a secondary role, one that operates in the framework of two principles: we support the territorial integrity of the Philippines and we recognize that the Bangsamoro people have legitimate grievances that need to be addressed. We take no position on the specific issues under negotiation, but do stress the importance of honoring agreements and understandings that the two principal parties reach. We are encouraged by the position taken by the late head of the MILF renouncing terrorism, but over the past year, we have become increasingly concerned at reports of ongoing and deeper connections between the MILF and Jemmah Islamayah, a terrorist organization that targets citizens of states where it operates, and American citizens as well.

We are deeply concerned about the security of critical sea lanes such as the Malacca and Singapore Straits, through which flows the economic lifeblood of East Asia. We know that terrorists in Southeast Asia are increasingly turning to soft targets. Moreover, as both the physical and political space in which they find sanctuary shrinks – as the noose tightens – we have good reason to believe terrorist will turn increasingly to the most unregulated of spaces – the sea.

Al Qaida’s attacks on commercial shipping in Yemen and the Arabian Sea; and planned or attempted to attacks in several straits, including the Strait of Gibraltar separating Europe and North Africa, provide a model. Here in Southeast Asia, as piracy and armed robbery in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has rapidly increased, we have begun to focus on the potential for a disastrous maritime terrorist incident. For the past year, in ARF and ASEAN meetings and elsewhere, the United States has raised its concerns. We have also advanced some ideas about how this threat might be mitigated. We believe it essential to work with the countries of the region to rapidly improve maritime security.

Promoting a Peaceful Korean Peninsula

Another critical component of our security policy in Asia is the achievement of a peaceful, nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula. North Korea's nuclear weapons program is a serious threat to regional security in East Asia. We have called for its complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement. We also want to eliminate North Korea's long-range ballistic missile program; to end its export of missiles and other WMD materials; and to reduce the conventional military threat. North Korea is simply terrible on human rights, but the nuclear programs have the focus of attention now.

Why do we insist on the verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's entire nuclear program?

Experience has shown that we cannot allow the North’s commitment to completely dismantle its nuclear arms program to be put off into the distant future. That happened in 1994, when, under the Agreed Framework, North Korea froze its plutonium-related nuclear activities at Yongbyon in exchange for the provision of nuclear power facilities, promising to dismantle the Yongbyon program once those civilian power facilities were completed. But instead of respecting that agreement, North Korea actually used the period to begin a new uranium-based program aimed at developing nuclear weapons.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s recent revelations put the lie to North Korea’s denials of this program. Accepting a partial solution would now permit North Korea, at any time, to resume its use of nuclear threats to blackmail the international community.

We have insisted upon multilateral talks because DPRK's nuclear arms program is not just a bilateral U.S.-North Korean issue. Indeed, if we fail, the consequences will be felt in the immediate neighborhood long before they are felt in the United States. Other countries need to bring their interests, influence, and resources to bear, not only in persuading North Korea to end its nuclear arms program but to ensure that the program is never resumed and that broader conditions on the Korean Peninsula are conducive
to lasting peace and security. It is something of an irony that many of those who criticize the U.S. for being impatient and unilateral also charge the U.S. with moving too slowly and relaying on international partners in dealing with North Korea. The six-party process that has now begun brings the parties most concerned to the table and is, we believe, the best route forward. The United States is committed to finding a peaceful and diplomatic resolution to the issue, though we have taken no option off the table.

Meanwhile, the U.S. is working with many of North Korea's neighbors in East Asia to enhance law enforcement and judicial cooperation to address North Korea's illicit and criminal activities. North Korea is involved in activities such as counterfeiting, drug-running, and smuggling in order to earn cash to support the regime and its military.

We are also working towards implementing the President's Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which seeks to enhance cooperation and coordination among countries around the world to stop illicit proliferation–related trafficking. While not directed at North Korea, North Korea is affected by PSI because it is the world's leading proliferator of missiles and missile technology. We are working with various countries in the region on PSI. It is important to underscore that PSI activities are voluntary and fully consistent with national legal authorities and international law.

Promoting Positive Chinese Engagement

While some have observed that we are enjoying the best bilateral relationship with China in over thirty years, it is also true that it remains a complex and dynamic relationship that defies short slogans or simple description. China's emergence as an economic powerhouse in Asia is an additional significant dynamic in the region. We welcome China's increasing contribution to and participation in regional and global institutions as a means to promote stability and prosperity. We have developed promising new areas of cooperation with China ranging from counter-terrorism to stability in South and Northeast Asia. Important differences remain, particularly on human rights and strategies to assure non-proliferation. Evan as we hope to turn non-proliferation from an area of difference into one of accord, we believe China should make a more effective effort to implement those agreements that it has already made.

In an unprecedented way, China's security is now inexorably linked to international commerce. China has a huge stake in maintaining access to the U.S. and other foreign markets and in preserving the current international trading regime. Anyone who questions this proposition should take a look at our trade balance. We welcome a China that is open and transparent and fully expect it to meet its WTO obligations.

Taiwan is a clear example of where the U.S. and China's interests do not completely mesh. Our abiding interest is in a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait differences. We have told China that its missile deployments across the Strait from Taiwan and its refusal to renounce the use of force are incompatible with a peaceful approach.

We will not improve our relations with China at Taiwan's expense. We call on both sides to reduce tensions, and to create an atmosphere conducive to cross Strait dialogue without preconditions. We are convinced we can make progress without abandoning our dialogue with Taiwan.

The future of Taiwan is critical concern facing East Asia. The United States has an abiding interest in the preservation of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. We do not support Taiwan independence and oppose moves by either side to unilaterally change the status quo. For Beijing, this means no use of force or coercive measures against Taiwan.

For Taiwan, this means exercising prudence in all areas touching on cross-strait relations and avoiding overtly provocative gestures that advocate or appear to advocate independence.

Strengthening Regional Institutions

Strengthening of regional institutions, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) the ASEAN Regional Forum, and APEC is important to promoting regional stability. These institutions support our common fight against terrorism and against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, while they promote peace and prosperity. As a consequence, we are determined to strengthen them.

For example, we have developed an ambitious plan of engagement with ASEAN. Through initiatives such as the ASEAN Cooperation Plan and the President’s Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative, we are pursuing closer U.S. ties to Southeast Asia while strengthening ASEAN’s capacity to promote economic growth and to deal with a variety of transnational threats, economic, and security issues.

We are actively engaged in the ASEAN Regional Forum and working to strengthen its ability to address security problems in the region. One area where we see a constructive role for the ARF is in preventive diplomacy, including on transnational and non-traditional security threats. We look forward to a productive ARF Ministerial meeting in Jakarta in July.

We have also made significant progress in APEC. That organization continues to pursue its traditional mission of advocating trade and investment liberalization in East Asia but is also active in areas like anti-corruption and transparency. At last October’s APEC meeting in Bangkok, APEC members agreed to expand APEC’s traditional mandate to encompass security concerns.

Transnational Issues

We believe regional approaches are effective at attacking transnational issues, like trafficking in persons, international crime, the spread of communicable disease, and environmental degradation, in which the United States shares the concerns of many in East Asia. In today’s world these, too, are security threats to the fabric of our societies. Coordinated actions, moral leadership, and immense resources are needed to counter them.

Our engagement includes assistance in combating trafficking in persons, preventing HIV/AIDS, and preserving the environment. In each of these areas, we are making progress with assistance from non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and from governments throughout this region.

Trafficking in persons is a form of modern-day slavery that affects many nations throughout the world. Like several countries in Asia, the United States is also a destination country for trafficked men, women, and children. We estimates that approximately 20,000 people are trafficked every year within the U.S. It’s difficult to combat trafficking – this is a crime that involves complex networks and few witnesses – and we are poised to work with your governments to prevent trafficking, prosecute perpetrators, and protect victims.

In 2003, the U.S. made available $17.5 million in bilateral assistance for Southeast Asia to combat trafficking. In addition, the President announced a new $50 million counter-trafficking initiative during his UN General Assembly speech in September 2003. This money will help countries throughout the world build capacity to combat trafficking, assist in the development of new laws, and support new efforts to protect victims. We are currently programming these funds.

To prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS, we have a five-year Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in place. Announced last year by President Bush, this $15 billion initiative is designed to turn the tide in combating the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. It is intended to prevent 7 million new infections; treat 2 million HIV-infected people; care for 10 million HIV-infected individuals and AIDS orphans. In the last two years, the U.S. Agency for International Development alone has spent up to $132 million to combat HIV/AIDS in Asia and the Near East Region.

In addition, the U.S. has pledged over $1.6 billion to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and malaria, and we maintain bilateral programs HIV/AIDS programs with 103 countries -- in East Asia, these are China, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines.

Yet, for all our financial and medical commitment to fight HIV/AIDS, we are barely scratching the surface of this devastating pandemic. Clearly, more needs to be done.

Promoting /Economic Prosperity and Democracy :

Strong, balanced, and mutually beneficial economic relationship also enhance security. For that reason, the United States will continue to put high priority on strengthening economic and commercial ties with Asia. We are convinced that economic reform and trade and investment liberalization are critical to achieving these goals. We are pleased that our Free Trade Agreement with Singapore took effect earlier this year and that we have successfully concluded an FTA with Australia. We look forward to beginning FTA negotiations with Thailand in the near future.

We will continue to promote the expansion of democracy and personal freedom worldwide. In East Asia, our efforts and our funding dollars are directed toward promoting the rule of law and free and fair elections, eliminating corruption, and combating transnational crime.

Several Asian economies are success stories of how economic growth contributed to democracy. South Korea, Thailand and Taiwan come immediately to mind, among other examples. Elections in seven East Asian countries take place this year, making the region a model for democratic change.

As Secretary Powell correctly noted in a speech last month in Washington, “As the quest for Asian democracy has grown, so has Asia’s prosperity, so has cooperation among regional states, and so has Asia’s peace.”

Security-Threats-Assurances

With this background of our security policy priorities in mind, I’d like to turn to some of the issues we'll be exploring over the next couple of days. First, our sponsors ask us to think about whether our concept of security has been altered by 9-11. While I can't speak for others, I believe there have been significant changes in our thinking in the United States. No longer is security simply a foreign policy issue in the domain of soldiers and diplomats. It is personal. Americans both at home and abroad want to be able to go about their lives - to take public transportation, to go to work, to go to school, and to go out to restaurants - without fear of attack. And they – like the citizens of all the countries represented here today - need the help and cooperation of governments to do this.

We have advised Americans to carry on with their lives to the extent possible. We cannot withdraw into a cocoon of fear or hide behind a defensive wall that blocks out contact with the outside world, but at the same time we should not blithely ignore the very real threat of terrorism.

I do not subscribe to the view that there is no real defense to random acts of terror. As an U.S. government official, I feel a deep responsibility to do all in my power to protect our citizens. We can and should develop and share the intelligence, military, financial, and other expertise to fight this scourge together. We need to prepare for threats of all conceivable natures and then have the courage to recognize we may be all wrong.

The global campaign against terrorism cannot come at the expense of our other commitments; instead, the campaign expands on our already solid foundation of cooperation in the region. It will require sharing the experiences, insights, and perceptions of all of us to come to grips with terror.

How can we dissuade the next generation from resorting to terror and violence? How can we promote justice? How can we provide economic opportunities to millions of young people? How can we prevent the spread of hatred? How can we promote the reconciliation of peoples of different ethnic, racial, and religious backgrounds? How can we encourage the peaceful resolution of conflicts? I hope that this conference can begin to answer some of these questions.

For the record, let me repeat in the clearest possible terms: the U.S. commitment to the security of the Asia-Pacific region is stronger than ever.

Thank you. I would be pleased to take your questions.